What is so special about online (as compared to offline) hate speech? by Brown, Alexander
 1 
What is so special about online (as compared to offline) hate speech? 
 
Alexander Brown 
University of East Anglia, UK 
 
Abstract 
There is a growing body of literature on whether or not online hate speech, or 
cyberhate, might be special compared to offline hate speech. This article aims to both 
critique and augment that literature by emphasising a distinctive feature of the Internet 
and of cyberhate that, unlike other features, such as ease of access, size of audience, 
and anonymity, is often overlooked: namely, instantaneousness. This article also asks 
whether there is anything special about online (as compared to offline) hate speech 
that might warrant governments and intergovernmental organisations contracting out, 
so to speak, the responsibility for tackling online hate speech to the very Internet 
companies which provide the websites and services that hate speakers utilise. 
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Introduction 
There is a growing body of literature which, not merely documents the variety and 
extent of hate speech on the Internet, but also considers whether or not online hate 
speech, or cyberhate, might be different—or special if that is the right word—
compared to offline hate speech (Citron, 2014; Citron and Norton, 2011; Cohen-
Almagor, 2015; Delgado and Stefancic, 2014; Perry and Olsson, 2009; Tsesis, 2001).1 
Part of the impetus behind this literature is also to better understand the distinctive 
challenges of combating cyberhate. This article aims to both critique and augment that 
literature by emphasising a distinctive feature of the Internet and of cyberhate that, 
unlike other features, such as ease of access, size of audience, and anonymity, is often 
overlooked: namely, instantaneousness. I argue that the instant nature of online 
communication encourages forms of cyberhate that are more spontaneous and, 
therefore, unconsidered.  
In addition to this, I seek to address a related set of questions that have also 
received less attention than they deserve. What, if anything, is different about the 
regulation of online (as compared to offline) hate speech? And, what, if anything, is 
different about free speech objections to the regulation of online (as compared to 
offline) hate speech? Focusing on the case of England and Wales, I argue that, when it 
comes to hate speech that does not fall under the scope of existing laws (offences) 
restricting the use of hate speech (i.e. the stirring up hatred offences2 and certain 
aggravated public order and harassment offences3)—such as hate speech that takes the 
form of negative stereotyping, group defamation (senso stricto), or even Holocaust 
denial—there are similarities between the ways governments have sought to outsource 
the regulation of online hate speech to Internet companies and the way governments 
have previously outsourced the regulation of offline hate speech to traditional media 
companies, including TV and radio broadcasters as well as newspapers and 
magazines. In both instances this reflects concerns over free speech that point toward 
governments not being directly involved in the regulation of hate speech (provided 
that the speech does not fall under the scope of existing hate speech laws). 
Nevertheless, one point of differentiation between the extra-governmental regulation 
of online and offline hate speech is the extent to which social networking websites 
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like Facebook, Internet messaging services like Twitter, and video-sharing platforms 
like YouTube, for example, do not typically adopt the prior self-restraint employed by 
traditional media companies whose application of editorial guidelines and codes of 
conduct can be used to prevent the broadcast or publication of hate speech before it is 
ever broadcast or printed. 
 
 
What’s special about online hate speech? 
I begin by running through some familiar features of the Internet that could 
potentially mark out online hate speech as different from offline hate speech.  
 
a. Anonymity 
One of the supposed advantages of the Internet as a medium for communication is 
that people are not compelled to reveal aspects of their offline identity unless they 
wish to do so. It has been suggested that the anonymity of the Internet can provide 
opportunities for freer speech because people can say what they think without fear 
that other people will react or respond unfavourably simply because of the colour of 
their skin, their sexual orientation, or even their gender identity, for instance (Graham, 
1999: 143). This cuts both ways, however. For, there is also evidence to suggest that 
the Internet disinhibits speakers to say things they would not otherwise say, face-to-
face (Suler, 2004). There are different strands to this cyber-psychological 
phenomenon, but one is that anonymity—even perceived anonymity—can embolden 
people to be more outrageous, obnoxious, or hateful in what they say than would be 
the case in real life (Branscomb, 1995: 1642–1643; Coffey and Woolworth, 2004: 1–
14; Citron, 2014: 57, 59–60; Cohen-Almagor, 2015: 86–87, 114, 146; Poland, 2016: 
22–24). For instance, the perceived anonymity of the Internet may remove fear of 
being held accountable for cyberhate and may also evince a sense that the normal 
rules of conduct do not apply; the associated feeling of liberation may drive people to 
give in to their worst tendencies (Citron, 2014: 58; Delgado and Stefancic, 2014: 322; 
Kang, 2000: 1135n.16). On the other hand, the perceived anonymity of the Internet 
may also liberate victims of online hate speech, as well as their supporters or 
defenders, to engage in counter-speech. That the hate speakers against whom counter-
speakers are speaking back do not know who the counter-speakers are could reduce 
the fear that counter-speakers might otherwise have had about being identified and 
targeted in their homes or workplaces. But, then, of course, the anonymity might also 
encourage counter-speakers to engage in their own hate speech attacking the original 
hate speakers (Coffey and Woolworth, 2004). 
 However, the anonymity of the Internet is more complex than it may first 
appear.4 For example, users of email accounts, Internet search engines, and media 
streaming applications now find that their different online identities are merged and 
crosschecked by their computer’s operating system, and some parts of this 
interconnected web of online identities may touch the offline world, such as when 
people are users of paid Internet applications and services that require them to give 
details of home addresses, phone numbers and credit card payment details which are 
verified. And so users cannot sensibly assume that they will not be tracked down by 
the police if they perform an illegal act of hate speech on a digital forum, social 
networking website or Internet messaging service, for example. The wider point is 
that today the police have powers to track down and seize digital evidence, along with 
other forms of evidence.  
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 Of course, not all hate speech is illegal. Far from it. So why would anonymity 
matter for speakers who only wish to engage in legally permissible acts of hate 
speech? Why would they choose to perform such acts online rather than offline? One 
possibility is that face-to-face hate speakers run the risk of being assaulted by the 
individuals they are verbally abusing or by other people at the scene. Because the 
online hate speaker is not physically present, he or she does not have to worry about 
an immediate physical backlash. Yet there remains the risk that a hate speaker can be 
found after the event, following a bit of detective work by the victims of their speech. 
Perhaps this is where anonymity comes in. Maybe people are more inclined to engage 
in even legally permissible acts of hate speech or more inclined to do so on a regular 
basis if they can use anonymous online identities which give no clue as to their true 
identities. Then again, the technical fixes that people might use to engage in 
anonymous cyberhate are not bulletproof; so there is always the risk of being 
discovered and then digitally outed. It is possible in the future that potential online 
hate speakers might become inhibited by stories of digital vigilantes; people who trap 
hate speakers into revealing who they are or simply hack into the accounts of online 
hate speakers, and then post their real identities online for all to see. 
  Notwithstanding these observations, what about online hate speech that does 
remain anonymous? Even here we must ask: Is anonymous online hate speech 
actually so very different to anonymous offline hate speech? If person A walks up to 
person B on the street and calls them a ‘Fucking X’, where X is a hate slur, and if A 
and B are strangers, and if A carries on walking, then A is probably anonymous to B 
in the sense that B does not know who A is and may have little means of finding out 
who A is. B may have difficulty even remembering what A looked like if the moment 
is particularly traumatic. So the chances of being able to provide an accurate 
description of A to the police as a means to identifying A may be limited, as are the 
chances of B bumping into A again at some time in the future. In any event, 
committed hate speakers always have the option of wearing masks, balaclavas or 
scarves to cover their faces, as many members of hate groups have done, both 
historically and up to the present day, when participating in rallies or demonstrations 




A second potentially distinctive feature of online hate speech is that there can be a 
physical distance between speaker and audience, meaning that the speaker can be 
non-visible or in some sense invisible to the audience and vice versa. Putting visual 
online communication aside for a moment, because non-visual online communication 
lacks the face-to-face dimension of some forms of offline hate speech—recall the 
street example described above—online hate speakers operate without the normal 
social-psychological cues of empathy and censure that tend to keep harmful or 
antisocial behaviour in check. For one thing, online communication often means that 
the immediate impacts of speech acts are unseen by the perpetrator. If one cannot see 
the emotional hurt wrought by one’s online hate speech, one may be more likely to 
downplay its significance. ‘It’s only harmless flaming; people shouldn’t take it so 
seriously.’ Moreover, when online, hate speakers cannot see the faces of other people 
who might disapprove of what they are saying. And, according to Danielle Keats 
Citron, ‘[p]eople are quicker to resort to invective when there are no social cues, such 
as facial expressions, to remind them to keep their behaviour in check’ (Citron, 2014: 
59). 
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 However, are these aspects salient by themselves to understanding what is 
special about online hate speech? For one thing, putting face-to-face hate speech 
aside, it should not be forgotten that traditional methods of spreading hate speech, 
such as through newspaper articles, printed leaflets, automated voice messages, letters 
sent through the mail, graffiti, and so on, also create physical distance between 
speaker and audience. So non-visual online communication does not have a monopoly 
on invisibility. It is also worth emphasising that online communication is increasingly 
combining text, audio and visual data streams. This means that visual interaction is no 
longer the preserve of offline communication. Thus, someone speaking to a group of 
people via a video communications link over the Internet using Webcams or 
Smartphones can see the faces of the audience.   
 But what about non-visual online communication specifically? Is this special 
in terms of the sort of hate speech it produces? Not necessarily. Even without seeing 
people’s faces, there can be explicit verbal social cues that remind online hate 
speakers (as well as offline hate speakers) to keep their behaviour in check. People 
can be criticised, condemned, or publicly shamed online for engaging in cyberhate—
and potentially this negative feedback can occur almost as instantaneously as in face-
to-face communication. Furthermore, a person who is committed to engaging in 
offline, face-to-face hate speech is unlikely to be deterred by seeing the anguish on 
the face of the victim, and may even take pleasure in it. It could be that hate speakers’ 
own consumption of hate speech—such as reading articles telling them that certain 
others ‘aren’t really like us’ or ‘are animals’—has already undermined or created 
deficits in natural empathy and sympathy for the suffering of members of the out-
groups in question so that, even if they see first-hand the anguish etched across the 
face of someone, it does not register with them in the normal way (Brown, 2015: 132–
137; Taylor, 2006). A hardcore hate speaker might also be indifferent to the risk of 
physical confrontation, and may even get off on the excitement of that risk; and may 
delight in disapproving glances by onlookers. If so, online hate speech does not lack 
something that would actually make a difference to the hard-core hate speaker—the 
sort of person who may recognise acts of offline, face-to-face hate speech as being 
inherently more risky than acts of online hate speech but actually prefers face-to-face 
hate speech because of, not in spite of, that difference. 
 
c. Community 
Perhaps, then, the real difference has to do with what the Internet means for 
situational online hate speakers—people who might or might not otherwise engage in 
offline hate speech but who are given pathways into cyberhate by the Internet. One 
pathway already discussed is anonymity. Another is people’s innate desire (including 
people with non-mainstream attitudes) to engage with like-minded others allied to the 
power of the Internet to put people in touch with each other—people who otherwise 
might be unable to connect due to geography or who might be simply ignorant of each 
other’s existence (Posner, 2002: 149–151). Take members of diasporas, for instance, 
for whom the Internet can be a useful means of communication, a way of keeping in 
touch with other people from their homeland, but also publicly affirming their ethnic 
and cultural identities. This, of course, may involve using the Internet to communicate 
with people still living in their homeland but also with other members of the diaspora 
in the countries they now reside in. Perhaps unsurprisingly, some hate speakers 
perform their hate speech as part of commenting on events in their homeland and as 
part of the wider practice of publicly affirming their identity, not least to other 
members of their diaspora. In R. v. Ahmad,5 for example, a dual nationality British-
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Pakastani business information technology graduate using the pseudonym Abu 
Jahiman engaged in an on-line discussion via the website IslamicAwakenings.com 
concerning a college in India that had allegedly banned its students from wearing the 
Burka. Mr. Ahmad wrote, ‘Where are the Muslims? They should storm these filthy 
rabid sub-monkeys and stomp on their jaws until they hear the sweet crack sound and 
then some.’ For this he was found guilty on one count of publishing written material 
with intent to stir up religious hatred and given a one-year sentence. 
 To give another example, people who lead hate groups may have a desire to 
grow their memberships both domestically and internationally, and the Internet may 
be invaluable for this purpose. On the other hand, new or prospective members of 
these groups may engage in online hate speech, using the websites set up by hate 
groups, if they feel isolated or if they crave the good opinion of other people who are 
members of hate groups, as part of a more general human drive for acceptance by 
others. Thus, hate groups have often tended to use the Internet to attract new members 
and ensure that their existing members feel connected (Citron, 2014: 61–62; Perry and 
Olsson, 2009). Here hate speech is addressed, not to victims, but to like-minded 
people. This is noticeable in the widespread use of negative stereotyping, vilification, 
group defamation, and Holocaust denial among online hate groups (Cohen-Almagor, 
2015; Tsesis, 2001). In the case of far right movements in Europe and the US, for 
example, researchers have pointed to the fact that groups have been assisted in 
building large networks based on shared racist ideologies by using the Internet and 
related forms of electronic or digital communication (Solomos and Schuster, 2002: 
45–46). Similarly, Cass Sunstein maintains that what is particularly striking about the 
activities of online hate groups is that they ‘provide links to one another, and 
expressly attempt to encourage both recruitment and discussion among like-minded 
people’ (Sunstein 2007: 57–58). ‘It is,’ as Sunstein puts it, ‘clear that the internet is 
playing a crucial role in permitting people who would otherwise feel isolated, or move 
on to something else, to band together and spread rumors, many of them paranoid and 
hateful’ (58).  
 In that sense online hate speech is different in one sense simply because it has 
become the method of choice among hate groups for cementing in-group statuses and 
fermenting a sense of intra-group community. Of course, this fact itself also relies on 
some other distinctive features of the Internet. One feature is that the Internet is 
relatively cheap and easy to use compared to other comparable means of 
communication (Delgado and Stefancic, 2014: 323)—that is, other means of 
achieving complex group communication involving targeted delivery or else reaching 
a mass audience, in short periods of time, and spanning huge distances. The ability of 
groups to render lack of physical proximity almost irrelevant in the maintenance of 
intra-group relations cannot be underestimated. Indeed, this virtue of the Internet is 
precisely what attracted the creators of social networking websites like Facebook and 
Internet messaging services like Twitter. The Internet helps bring people together, 
every kind of person. 
 Then there is hate speech that is intended not for an audience of like-minded 
thinkers but people whose opinion one is trying to change or people who may 
implicitly feel or think as one does but who are not presently disposed to articulating 
or venting those thoughts and feelings. Some forms of incitement to hatred, or stirring 
up hatred, are addressed to such people. But what makes stirring up hatred online 
different from stirring up hatred offline? The Internet is not the only way to reach a 
mass audience after all—consider printed leaflets, automated telephone messages, 
billboard and graffiti, newspaper and magazine articles, speeches at large public 
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meetings or demonstrations. Then again, the Internet has democratised mass 
communication. Access to traditional printed newsletters or leaflets requires either the 
social capital one needs to be on friendly terms with printers or else have lots 
purchasing power to get them to print leaflets that could have the potential to attract 
unwanted attention. Then one needs access to distribution networks capable of getting 
the printed material into the hands of a mass, geographically dispersed audience. Few 
individuals could have done what Henry Ford did in the 1920s when he used his 
nationwide Ford dealerships to distribute copies of his The Dearborn, containing anti-
Semitic stories (Woeste, 2012). Contemporary hate speakers, by contrast, do not need 
their own newspapers or national distribution networks to reach large audiences 
through social networking websites, online chat rooms and notice boards, comments 
pages, Internet messaging services, and video-sharing platforms, for instance. 
 The above points speak to the reasons why people might choose to utilise the 
Internet in order to transmit their hate speech. But what if the forms of hate speech 
that speakers transmit via the Internet are more or less indistinguishable from the hate 
speech they would find ways to transmit had the Internet never been invented and that 
they have traditionally transmitted through public appearances, printed material, and 
older forms of telephone and radio communication? What if the content of hate 
speech across online and offline platforms is similar and mutually reinforcing in 
situations where both are used equally heavily?6 If this is the case, then what the 
above points reveal perhaps is not the sui generis nature of the content of online as 
compared to offline hate speech, but simply something about the propensity or 
reasons some hate speakers have, perhaps the majority of hate speakers, for preferring 
the Internet over other modes of communication. 
 Now it might be objected at this point that, because of its democratic 
character, the Internet allows anyone (or almost anyone) to engage in hate speech and 
to attract an audience online, even if they lack rhetorical, linguistic and artistic skills. 
This, in turn (so the objection runs), means that online hate speech is likely to be 
different in quality as compared to offline hate speech; it is more likely to be basic, 
unsophisticated, unskilled. However, I find this generalisation to be unfounded. 
Although virtually anyone can gain access to the Internet, it is not the case that 
virtually anyone can attract a mass audience of followers, likes and clicks. In order for 
someone to engage in online hate speech in an effective way, that is, in a way that 
enables them to gain followers and to harm their victims, it seems to me that they are 
likely to need similarly high levels of rhetorical, linguistic and artistic skills as are 
required to engage in effective offline hate speech. Moreover, studies of the content of 
the hate speech used by online hate groups to communicate on shared issues and to 
attract and retain members shows a great deal of creativity, sophistication and nuance 
(Douglas et al, 2005; McNamee et al, 2010). Studies comparing content in the press 
and on Internet blogs also reveal that bloggers use detailed analogies and metaphors 
in denigrating protected groups (Musolff, 2015). 
 In light of all this, I want next to propose a way in which the Internet might 
itself encourage differences in the nature or content of the hate speech that people 
may choose to publish or send, along similar lines to the way that anonymity is 
thought to promote particularly vicious forms of hate speech. 
 
d. Instantaneousness 
As compared to printed leaflets, automated telephone messages, billboards, graffiti, 
newspaper and magazine articles, and speeches at large public meetings or 
demonstrations, the Internet provides people with almost instantaneous publishing. 
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On the Internet, the time delay between having a thought or feeling and expressing it 
to a particular individual who is located a long distance away, or to a group of 
likeminded people or to a mass audience can be a matter of seconds. By contrast, if, 
for example, an ordinary member of the public wants to distribute a group libel about 
Jews to a mass audience using traditional media, it can take a not-inconsiderable 
amount of time to design and print leaflets and to hand out those leaflets to people on 
the street or to send them to people through the post. It also takes time to create an 
automated telephone message, to set up the necessary phone accounts, to obtain a set 
of telephone numbers and to complete the automated calls. There is much less of a 
time-lag in the case of online publication. My hypothesis, then, is that, as compared to 
offline modes of communication, the Internet encourages forms of hate speech that 
are spontaneous in the sense of being instant responses, gut reactions, unconsidered 
judgments, off-the-cuff remarks, unfiltered commentary, and first thoughts. Among 
the common types of online hate speech that may be spontaneous in this sense are the 
use of abusive or cruel insults or demeaning language or threatening words against a 
person or group of people identified by their race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, 
sexual orientation, disability, gender identity, or other protected characteristics. The 
point is that the Internet not merely facilitates, but also encourages, instant responses 
that are by their nature more spontaneous in the aforementioned sense. I do not mean 
to suggest that online hate speech never takes the form of careful, well-thought-out, 
considered, painstaking, and extensively planned statements. Clearly it does. Instead, 
what I am suggesting is that some parts of the Internet encourage gut reactions, 
unconsidered judgments, off-the-cuff remarks, unfiltered commentary, and first 
thoughts, because they encourage instant responses.  
 By way of illustration, on 17 March 2012 Liam Stacey, a third-year 
undergraduate at Swansea University and user of the Twitter Internet messaging 
service, had spent the afternoon watching sport and drinking beer. One of the games 
he watched was an English Premiership football match between Bolton Wanderers 
and Tottenham Hotspur in which a black player, Fabrice Muamba, collapsed on the 
pitch with a life-threatening (and ultimately career-ending) heart attack. Not long after 
the match Stacey posted this message on Twitter, ‘LOL fuck Muamba he’s dead.’ 
Several people responded angrily to the message and exercised their prerogative to 
engage in counter-speech on Twitter by calling Stacey ‘a greasy little welsh sheep 
shagger’ and a ‘silly fat wanker’. Stacey responded with a string of further messages 
including, ‘You are a silly cunt your mother’s a wog and your dad is a rapist, bonjour 
you scruff northern cunt.’ He was later arrested and pleaded guilty to the offence of 
racially aggravated harassment, alarm or distress of intent to users of the Twitter 
Internet messaging service.7 What would have happened had Mr. Stacey lacked the 
option of using Twitter or some other Internet-based method of communication? 
Maybe after watching the Muamba incident he might have planned to wake up early 
the next day to design and print a racist leaflet explaining why black football players 
were inferior to white football players. But by the time he woke up the next day it is 
also possible that some second thoughts would have occurred to him. He might have 
remembered the fact that growing up he was a fan of several black players. Moreover, 
because other people would not have reacted to his Tweet, he would not have also 
instantly reacted by sending them further Tweets containing racist epithets. That still 
further responses from other Twitter users came hot on the heels of his additional 
Tweets created a frenzy of Tweeting back and forth. In other words, the speed of 
messages encouraged yet more, spontaneous messages and, with it, an escalation of 
the cyberhate (Coffey and Woolworth, 2004). The moral of the story is Tweet in 
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haste, repent at leisure. It could also be the moral of a high proportion of online hate 
speech. 
 As I have said, there are also parts of the Internet that facilitate and encourage 
more considered, non-spontaneous forms of hate speech, manifested in so-called hate 
sites that are carefully constructed to appeal to designated audiences, based on shared 
ideologies, senses of grievance, religious beliefs, and so forth. The content is often 
uploaded slowly and carefully by people who may have given a great deal of thought 
to what they are saying, based on a pattern of saying the same thing over time. On the 
other hand, where hate sites include comments pages or links to online chat rooms 
and notice boards available for comments by ad hoc contributors, this can encourage 
users to post messages of support and agreement instantaneously, sometimes 
spontaneously reacting to each other. But, at any rate, I do not mean to suggest that all 
parts of the Internet equally encourage spontaneous hate speech. 
 No doubt some people will point out at this stage that online hate speech does 
not have a monopoly on spontaneity. And they would be right, of course. After all, 
person A can be travelling on a bus, and upon witnessing an event or situation 
involving person B, spontaneously shout ‘Fucking X!’, where X is a hate slur, at 
person B. This might not be premeditated and might also be an instant response, gut 
reaction, unconsidered judgment, off-the-cuff remark, unfiltered comment, or first 
thought. Person A would probably be able to do this a few seconds quicker than it 
would take him to reach into his pocket pull out a smart phone and Tweet the 
following, ‘Am on bus and a fucking X just did Y—typical!’ Face-to-face hate speech 
also has the advantage, from the hate speaker’s perspective, of being able to target 
someone without knowing that person’s name or user name. Of course, the hate 
speaker could get out his smart phone, take a picture of person B and post it on 
Twitter with the words, ‘Am on bus and this fucking X (see pic) just did Y—typical!’ 
But unless person A knows person B’s email address or Twitter or Facebook user 
names, he cannot directly message person B, whereas he can say something directly 
to person B in a face-to-face encounter; provided he happens to come across person B 
in the offline world. (Then again, once person A does know person B’s email address 
or Twitter or Facebook user names, A can send messages to B even when they do not 
come across each other in the offline world. Moreover, one advantage that online 
publishing has over print publishing is that, with a smart phone, the hate speaker can 
instantly publish his first thoughts on the events or situation on the bus involving 
person B in a way that would be impossible with print publishing.) 
 However, the response I would make to this point is simply that the nature of 
online hate speech is likely to reflect a combination of qualities that make online 
communication special, each of which would not, when considered in isolation, make 
a significant difference. In other words, the world of online communication is special 
because it combines anonymity, lack of physical presence, being relatively cheap and 
easy to use, and the capacity for instantaneous publishing—together these qualities 
may drive the spontaneity of some online hate speech. Consider the bus example once 
again. Now the hate speaker on the bus is anonymous, in the sense that other 
passengers may not know his identity. And let us suppose he can leave the bus before 
the driver demands to know his identity. Then again, he is physically present in the 
situation, which means he opens himself up to counter-actions on the part of the 
person he has verbally abused or other people on the bus. The hate speaker could end 
up being shoved, kicked, slapped, punched, or assaulted in some other way. There is 
always the risk that an online hate speaker could be identified and tracked down in the 
offline world by vigilantes, but that risk is low and the hate speaker can take some 
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precautions. Engaging in face-to-face hate speech carries a more immediate threat of 
physical backlash. It seems to me that the very fact of physical presence and risk of 
physical assault may cause people to think twice before engaging in face-to-face hate 
speech. This, in turn, could mean that they are less prone to engage in spontaneous 
acts of hate speech. Of course, there will always be hate speakers who are reckless, 
not in control of their emotions, or actively embrace the risks involved in face-to-face 
hate speech. However, my hypothesis is not that online hate speech is always 
spontaneous and offline hate speech, including face-to-face hate speech, is never 
spontaneous. Rather, my hypothesis is that, as compared to offline modes of 
communication, the Internet encourages forms of hate speech that are spontaneous in 
virtue of the combination of qualities that online communication possesses. 
 
e. Harm 
It is now time to discuss whether or not there is anything special about the harmful 
effects of online (as compared to offline) hate speech. I take it that this is a 
quantitative, as well as a qualitative, question: that it pertains to how much hate 
speech occurs on the Internet as compared to other domains as well as whether or not 
online hate speech has distinctive harmful effects, such as creating a unique type of 
climate of hatred or causing a singular sort of psychological distress. An inquiry 
focusing on possible differences between the harmful effects of online, as compared 
to offline, hate speech would also have to isolate other relevant variables, including 
the relative harmfulness of different forms of hate speech, such as slurs, negative 
stereotypes, group defamation, incitement to hatred, denial of atrocities, and so on 
(e.g. Brown, 2015: ch. 3) and the relative harmfulness of hate speech targeted at 
different groups, such as racial, ethnic, national, religious, sexual orientation, gender, 
disability groups, and so on (e.g. Brown, 2016, 2017). 
 Nevertheless, let us focus for a moment on my previous contention that the 
Internet encourages spontaneous forms of hate speech. If I am right, what implications 
might this have for the further issue of the distinctive harmfulness of online (as 
compared to offline) hate speech? The short answer is that, at present, it is impossible 
to say. As far as I am aware, there is no social scientific evidence yet available that 
would support any firm generalisations about the comparative psychological effects of 
being subjected to spontaneous hate speech as compared to premeditated hate speech, 
whether online or offline. In the absence of social scientific evidence, one is left with 
anecdotal evidence and commonsense reasoning; and, perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
latter is likely to prove inconclusive. Maybe it could be more distressing for some 
victims, in one sense, to experience unthinking hate abuse, insofar as it also suggests 
that one’s status is so low that people do not bother to give consideration to how one 
might feel. Then again, maybe it could be more unsettling for other victims, in 
another sense, to experience premeditated hate abuse, since it implies that one is the 
object of a determined and planned campaign of hatred. 
 Putting the issue of spontaneity to one side, however, it might be thought that 
being verbally abused face-to-face because of the colour of one’s skin, or because of 
one’s gender identity, sexuality, disability, or religion, say, is more psychologically 
harmful than being verbally abused online. Perhaps because the former is more 
personal in some sense: because one’s real or offline identity is on show as opposed 
to merely one’s online identity. Then again, why should we assume that one’s offline 
identity is any more inherently real than one’s online identity? For some people there 
may be a sense in which they are being more real, or more authentic at least, online 
because they feel freer or less inhibited in revealing their true selves. At any rate, 
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what if the online hate abuse is more frequent and comes from a larger number of 
people? The effect might be worse because of the volume of abuse facilitated by 
online communication. Moreover, it might be that online hate speech has especially 
harmful effects because it is done in front of larger audiences, thus ramping up the 
public shame element. In other words, if it turns out that being verbally attacked tends 
to produce more shame or anguish when done in front of a larger rather than smaller 
audience, then it is surely relevant that targeted online hate speech can be, and often 
is, made public to a very large audience online. Then again, there are a great many 
other ways for hate speakers to launch verbal attacks in front of a very large audience 
besides via the Internet. A right-wing or anti-Semitic comedian, for instance, could 
give a live comedy performance with a couple of thousand people in the audience, 
and the comedian could point to a person in the audience and say, ‘Oh look, here we 
have an X. Are you sure you paid to get in tonight?’, where X is a hate insult.  
 Then again, when harmful effects are being calculated, quantity will matter as 
much as quality. Quantity can be a function of the duration of time in which the hate 
speech is publicly available. One point worth making—a point made by Citron 
(Citron, 2014: 4)—is that there is a potential difference between the sort of street 
graffiti hate speech case discussed by Jeremy Waldron in The Harm in Hate Speech 
(2012) and hate messages posted online: namely, the latter can last longer. Whereas 
graffiti tends to fade, be washed away by the rain, painted over, or lost when buildings 
are demolished, hate messages posted online remain in pristine digital form. That 
being said, the position of hate websites and other websites containing hate content in 
Internet search engine results can be subject to change over time. Even so, a more 
pressing point is quite simply whether or not the Internet has become the preferred 
method of performing acts of hate speech for most hate speakers, most of the time. 
 What does seem clear is that there is a pressing need for existing research on 
the harmful effects of hate speech (Brown, 2015; Gelber and McNamara, 2016; Jay, 
2009; Leets, 2002) to be extended or augmented to include research directly 
comparing the harmful effects of online and offline hate speech. 
 
 
The regulation of online hate speech 
What, if anything, is different about the regulation of online (as compared to offline) 
hate speech? Early discussions of the regulation of cyberhate often focused on the 
question of whether or not laws and legal cases that traditionally concerned the 
constitutional limits of free speech in offline spaces could be applied to speech in 
cyberspace (Tsesis, 2001). This continues to be an important issue, of course. But I 
want to focus on something else. What I want to explore is whether or not the nature 
and variety of cyberhate (as compared to offline hate speech) poses an especially 
serious challenge for the regulation of hate speech by means of legislation and 
criminal prosecutions. 
 Because the Internet allows cheap access to mass communication and easy 
transmission of words, images, music and videos, it has a tendency to support and 
encourage ingenuity, creativity, playfulness, and innovation in such content (Fuchs, 
2014). The same applies to hate speech. Online hate speech is heterogeneous and 
dynamic: it takes many different forms and those forms can shift and expand over 
relatively short spaces of time (Citron, 2014; Cohen-Almagor, 2015; Delgado and 
Stefancic, 2014; Tsesis, 2001). Tomorrow’s instances of cyberhate may not always be 
easily predicted on the basis of today’s instances of cyberhate. The Internet is home to 
forms of hate speech that are banned by existing hate speech laws in England and 
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Wales, including the stirring up of hatred toward people based on certain protected 
characteristics and certain public order and harassment offences aggravated by 
hostility toward people based on certain protected characteristics, for example.8 But 
the Internet is also home to hate speech that is not directly banned by existing hate 
speech laws in England and Wales, including forms of negative stereotyping, 
vilification, group defamation, and Holocaust denial.9 In both instances, it is 
important to ask whether cyberhate can mutate at a faster rate than regulations can 
keep pace with, and what implications this has for its regulation. 
 Take stirring up hatred offences and certain aggravated public order and 
harassment offences in England and Wales. In some instances governments have 
spent years considering whether or not to introduce new legislation, months passing 
draft bills back and forth between the House of Commons and the House of Lords. 
Following on from this, legal professionals, including police, prosecutors, and judges 
have grappled with the wording of the legislation applying it to a relatively small 
number of cases which have slowly emerged over time. Meanwhile the nature of the 
hate speech being legislated against, including online hate speech, has developed well 
beyond anything the legislators might have anticipated. I have in mind, not merely the 
range of groups who are the subject of online hate speech that is covered by existing 
hate speech bans in England and Wales, but also the specific bits of language that are 
used to perform acts of cyberhate. In addition to this, there is the problem that 
criminal prohibitions necessarily involve the punishment of offenders after the fact. If 
people commit these offences online, the messages they have sent (or the content they 
have posted) have already been viewed and the damage done before the case ever 
reaches a court of law. 
 Nevertheless, it is not clear that this rapidity of change and the challenge of 
combating online hate speech by means of legislation and criminal prosecutions is 
significantly different for online as compared to offline hate speech. Hate speakers 
who prefer to do their hate speaking face-to-face can also exhibit ingenuity, creativity, 
playfulness, and innovation in content, and this too can pose a problem for legislators 
and legal professionals. Think of the hate speaker who prefers to perform his hate 
speech to large audiences in person—where his charisma can shine—but who also 
knows full well that in order to be convicted of stirring up religious hatred offences 
(in England and Wales) public prosecutors must prove both intent to stir up hatred and 
the use of threatening words or behaviour.10 Such a hate speaker has reason to be 
ingenious in how he or she goes about performing acts of hate speech in order to stay 
one step ahead of the authorities, whether he or she engages in online or offline hate 
speech. Much the same problem afflicts the use of campus speech codes to tackle the 
perennial problem of hate speech on university campuses in the US. Codes and 
guidance brochures will be amended and adapted by university authorities and 
discipline tribunals at much slower rates than hate speech itself mutates (Alexander, 
1996; Brison, 1998; Craddock, 1995; Delgado, 1991; Downs, 1993, 2005; Lawrence, 
1990; Shiell, 2009; Smolla, 1990; Strossen, 1990; Tsesis, forthcoming). 
 I also believe that there are certain similarities in the moral responsibilities of 
Internet companies and broadcast and print media companies. If Internet companies 
allow online hate speech to occur by providing social networking websites, Internet 
messaging services, email accounts, online chat rooms and message boards, 
comments pages, video-sharing platforms, and so on, then arguably they share some 
moral responsibility for regulating it (Cohen-Almagor, 2015). The general principle is 
that, if one invents or is responsible for maintaining technology which facilitates 
harmful and sometimes illegal actions, especially if one profits from this technology, 
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then it is right that one should be responsible for introducing measures designed to 
prevent or limit these actions, even if one never intended to facilitate them in the first 
place. Of course, the nature and extent of the moral responsibility may depend on, 
inter alia, the presence of other agents who may be responsible for creating a climate 
of hatred in which people think it acceptable to engage in online hate speech, the 
extent to which hate speech would exist in some form even without the technology, 
and whether the technology in fact encourages, as well as facilitates, hate speech. But 
arguably, very similar arguments about moral responsibilities apply to broadcast and 
print media companies. 
 Notwithstanding all this, it might be countered that there is another relevant 
difference between the regulation of online and offline hate speech in terms of the 
special capacity of companies to regulate their own industry. Partly as a result of the 
technical challenges in tackling online hate speech perhaps there has been a tendency 
to assume that the regulation of online hate speech is most effectively done by the 
very Internet companies whose websites and platforms are being used to transmit the 
hate speech in the first place. The basic idea is that Internet companies are much 
better placed than governments to develop and implement terms of usage, community 
standards, codes of conduct, and so forth, for their users. They are also better placed 
to train specialist teams of employees to quickly moderate or provide swift 
adjudications on content that may have been in contravention of the relevant 
standards, meaning that content could be removed or access to content blocked within 
a very short space of time of being uploaded or sent. Because these moderators or in-
house regulators are likely to be themselves knowledgeable about, and heavy users of, 
the websites and platforms in question they may be in a good position to keep pace 
with innovations in online hate speech. If the relevant standards or codes are defined 
in sufficiently generalised language, the moderators can use their discretion in 
applying them to the content they come across. Because the Internet companies are 
acting as self-regulators they do not have to pause to seek guidance or permission 
from legislators and legal professionals about the content in question or their 
adjudications of the relevant standards or codes. They can shift their interpretations of 
the wording—and even the wording itself—almost instantaneously. And because they 
are not required to publicise or justify their adjudications to those users whose content 
is removed or to other stakeholders including Internet rights organisations, they are 
not hamstrung by precedent. If they feel they need to remove a certain form of hate 
speech that has previously not been removed or vice versa, then they can. They do not 
need to find reasons for doing so that would satisfy a court of law. All of this builds in 
a certain degree of flexibility and swiftness into the tools used to combat online hate 
speech, the quality of which is partly its being heterogeneous and dynamic. 
 It should perhaps come as no surprise (it might be further argued) that Internet 
companies have for some time been setting out, and to a greater or lesser extent 
enforcing, their own rules concerning online hate speech. For example, YouTube’s 
‘community guidelines’ states this about ‘Hateful content’: ‘we don’t support content 
that promotes or condones violence against individuals or groups based on race or 
ethnic origin, religion, disability, gender, age, nationality, veteran status or sexual 
orientation/gender identity, or whose primary purpose is inciting hatred on the basis 
of these core characteristics.’11 And its ‘Policy Centre’ specifies the following policy 
on ‘Hate Speech’: ‘We encourage free speech and try to defend your right to express 
unpopular points of view, but we don’t permit hate speech.’12 Facebook’s ‘community 
standards’ state ‘Facebook removes hate speech’.13 Likewise, Twitter’s ‘Ad Policy’ 
states ‘Twitter prohibits the promotion of hate content’.14 And Microsoft’s ‘Code of 
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Conduct’ includes the following code: ‘Don’t engage in activity that is harmful to 
you, the Services or others (e.g. transmitting viruses, stalking, communicating hate 
speech or advocating violence against others).’15 
 Nor should we be surprised to see transnational political organisations joining 
forces with Internet companies to combat online hate speech, not instead of joining 
forces with governments but in appreciation of the reality that Internet companies 
might be not merely more inclined to work with them but also in a better position to 
get fast results. On 31 May 2016, for example, the European Commission and various 
major Internet companies announced a new ‘Code of Conduct On Countering Illegal 
Hate Speech Online’.16 Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube have agreed to 
clarify on their terms of usage that they will prohibit illegal incitement to hatred. 
Moreover, they have agreed to put in place clear and effective processes to review and 
remove or disable access to such content within 24 hours.17 Although the agreement 
amounted to no more than a public commitment to enforce the new Code and the new 
Code is not legally binding on these Internet companies, the mere fact that they were 
willing to make this public commitment demonstrates three salient facts. First, it 
suggests that Internet companies really do have extraordinary technical ability to 
control content, despite their sometimes claiming otherwise as a means of abdicating 
their moral responsibility and, more importantly for them, their legal liability. Second, 
it is evidence of the fact that Internet companies are increasingly accepting that it is an 
appropriate function of such companies to police, so to speak, online hate speech and 
that they have a responsibility to the victims of such speech to make the Internet more 
secure. Third, it highlights the extent to which Internet companies are willing to work 
with a range of partners, including not only governments but also intergovernmental 
organisations and non-governmental organisations, in order to ensure that they are in 
the vanguard, and therefore in control, of creating effective tools to control online 
hate speech.18 The irony here is that Internet companies are answerable for providing 
hate speakers with ever-more powerful online tools for spreading their messages but 
are also best placed to police the use of those tools. And so the Internet, we might say, 
provides unprecedented opportunities for hate speakers and regulators of hate speech 
alike. 
 But does any of this demonstrate that there is a difference in kind between the 
regulation of online and the regulation of offline hate speech? Arguably not. For it 
could also be said that broadcast and print media companies are much better placed 
than governments to rise to the technical challenges of regulating content that is 
communicated via their radio and television stations, newspapers and magazines. 
They, too, have knowledgeable staff who can be trained to intervene swiftly to deal 
with problematic content. 
 Furthermore, even if both intergovernmental organisations and governments 
are willing to entertain the notion that it is Internet companies themselves who can 
and perhaps should take the lead in tackling the problem of online hate speech rather 
than the police and the courts, this does not mean that there is a division of labour in 
combating online and offline hate speech. Now it is certainly true that there is no 
mention of the words ‘computer system’, ‘the Internet’, ‘website’, ‘trolling’, 
‘flaming’, ‘cyberhate’ and other terms relating to online hate speech in legislation 
defining stirring up hatred offences in England and Wales.19 Similarly, among the 
public order and harassment offences that can be charged as aggravated offences 
(aggravated by hostility toward people based on certain protected characteristics), 
there is no mention of the Internet.20 Interestingly, the Communications Act 2003 
prohibits messages sent ‘by means of a public electronic communications network’ 
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that are grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character.21 But 
when it comes to prosecuting these offences as aggravated offences the matter is dealt 
with only in Crown Prosecution Service Guidelines and not in the relevant hate crime 
legislation.22 Nevertheless, it is worth emphasising that existing hate speech laws do 
apply, as written and as interpreted, equally to online and offline communication, and 
have already been applied by the police, prosecutors, and the courts to online 
communication—consider the Stacey case discussed above.  
 There are also similarities between the moral responsibilities of governments 
for regulating online and offline hate speech. Suppose one believes that governments 
cannot, and should not, abrogate entirely their role in ensuring that citizens’ rights are 
respected, even when it comes to the controversial and technically challenging arena 
of regulating print and broadcast media. If media companies are responsible for 
facilitating acts of hate speech in virtue of providing access to printed and broadcast 
communications, then governments are also responsible for the environment in which 
media companies operate. So, on this view, governments should at least work to 
ensure that there is some form of appropriate and effective regulatory framework for 
dealing with hate speech in the media, even when it comes to hate speech that might 
not fall under the scope of existing hate speech laws in England and Wales. If one 
holds this view about print and broadcast media regulation, then surely the same logic 
would apply to the regulation of hate speech on the Internet. There are, of course, 
different models for this responsibility. At one extreme is for governments to fully 
devolve regulatory responsibilities to individual Internet companies, and not seek to 
provide any legislative or regulatory framework, but instead liaise with the companies 
and provide guidance and suggestions. Or it could devolve power to independent 
Internet regulatory bodies that operate within a broadly defined legal framework, and 
compel Internet companies to comply with its standards. Or it could devolve power to 
an industry-based self-regulating body which writes and enforces its own standards. 
But the bottom line is that these questions about the moral responsibility of 
governments for Internet regulation seem quite similar to questions about the moral 
responsibility of governments for the regulation of traditional media. 
 At this point it might be objected, however, that if, as I have suggested, the 
Internet has become the medium of choice for hate speakers, and that online hate 
speech may be more dangerous than its offline equivalent—because of the quantity of 
harm caused by online hate speech if not also the quality of harm caused by online 
hate speech—then, arguably, there should be a greater role for the state in governing 
Internet regulation, for example, by imposing a statutory regulatory framework on 
Internet companies and by specifying strict standards to be employed by the regulator. 
However, the one does not follow from the other. When governments choose not to 
impose a statutory regulatory framework on printed media, they do so not because 
they downgrade the potential for harm but because they place an emphasis on 
freedom of the media. Perhaps the same goes for the Internet. If governments impose 
a statutory regulatory framework on Internet companies and specify strict standards to 
be employed by the regulator this also poses a significant threat to freedom of the 
Internet, that is, a threat to the free exchange of ideas online. For example, based on 
values of democracy and legitimacy, the Internet might be viewed as an especially 
important site of political speech and public discourse more generally. So a higher 
risk of harmful speech does not necessarily imply that a higher level of government 
intervention is appropriate, all things considered. I shall return to discuss free speech 
objections to the regulation of hate speech in the next section. 
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 However, there is, I think, at least one important difference between the form 
of self-regulation operated by traditional media companies and the moderation or 
content regulation imposed by Internet companies. Internet companies involved in 
providing social networking websites and Internet messages services are, like 
government organisations and agencies, in a position of reacting to hate speech 
messages and content once it has been sent through the Internet or posted on the Web. 
Now the speed of that reaction may be much faster for Internet companies than for 
government. As mentioned, some Internet companies have committed to removing 
hate speech content or access to hate speech content within 24 hours. But it remains a 
form of ex-post self-regulation. By contrast, in the case of traditional media 
companies the decisions they make about how to apply editorial guidelines occur and 
take effect prior to the relevant content being broadcast or published. This means that 
content which is deemed to fall foul of the editorial standards never sees the light of 
day. It is a form of prior self-restraint (Jacobson and Schlink, 2012). So, for example, 
the BBC operates under its own ‘Editorial Guidelines’ and these include the following 
guideline on ‘Portrayal’. 
 
We aim to reflect fully and fairly all of the United Kingdom’s people and cultures 
in our services.  Content may reflect the prejudice and disadvantage which exist 
in societies worldwide but we should not perpetuate it.  In some instances, 
references to disability, age, sexual orientation, faith, race, etc.  may be relevant 
to portrayal.  However, we should avoid careless or offensive stereotypical 
assumptions and people should only be described in such terms when editorially 
justified.23 
 
When the editors responsible for particular television or radio programmes apply this 
guideline to proposed content, or when they refer planned content to the managing 
output controller for the relevant group within the BBC (e.g. News) or to the Chief 
Adviser on Editorial Policy, the decisions they reach can result in changes to content 
prior to broadcast.  
 Of course, broadcast and print media companies also operate under additional 
regulatory frameworks that pertain to content that has already been broadcast or 
published. In the case of the BBC, for example, once content has been broadcast 
people can make a complaint to the Editorial Complaints Unit, including in instances 
where they perceive that a hate speech has been broadcast in contravention of the 
standard on portrayal. If the decision does not go in their favour they can then appeal 
to the Editorial Standards Committee (ESC) which is operated under the auspices of 
the BBC Trust.24 In the case of newspapers in the UK, people can potentially bring a 
complaint against a newspaper for printing hate speech by referring to clause 12 of the 
Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) Code of Practice for Editors. The 
first part of clause 12 states: ‘The press must avoid prejudicial or pejorative reference 
to an individual’s, race, colour, religion, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation or to 
any physical or mental illness or disability.’25 This Code of Practice has its 
weaknesses, but the key point I want to stress here is that prior self-restraint might be 
less commonly employed by Internet companies than by traditional media companies. 
 
 
Free speech objections to the regulation of online hate speech 
What, if anything, is different about free speech objections to the regulation of online 
(as compared to offline) hate speech? There is potentially a great deal for defenders of 
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free speech to be concerned about when it comes to the regulation of hate speech, 
whether online or offline—concern, for instance, that hate speech laws can be subject 
to abuse of power, are ineffective, and tend to chill speech in ways that are harmful to 
autonomy on the part of speakers and damaging to democracy and legitimacy on the 
part of society as a whole (e.g. Baker, 2009, 2012; Dworkin, 2012; Hare, 2012; 
Heinze, 2016; Post, 2012; Strossen, 1990, 2012; Weinstein, 2009, forthcoming). 
There are things that advocates of (some) hate speech laws can, and do, say in 
response to these standard objections, of course (e.g. Brison 1998; Brown, 2008, 
2015, forthcoming d; Delgado and Stefancic, 1996, 2009; Gelber and McNamara, 
2014). Nevertheless, the point I wish to make here is that many specific concerns that 
people may have about the regulation of online hate speech by Internet companies in 
particular are not sui generis but are instead instances of more generic concerns. 
  Let me try to justify this with three examples. One concern typically raised 
about hate speech laws enacted by governments is that such laws tend to be vague and 
because of this chill various forms of valuable speech, including not least political 
speech or public discourse more broadly construed. Put simply, if a law is expressed 
in a way that is too unclear for a person of average intelligence to reasonably forecast 
whether or not his or her speech falls under it, then to avoid the risk of adverse legal 
consequences he or she may refrain from saying anything remotely controversial, 
critical, or provocative (Baker, 2009: 157; Strossen, 1990: 521; Weinstein, 2009: 51, 
2017). But exactly the same concern might also be applied to community standards 
adopted by Internet companies because of the potential vagueness in the terminology 
used to specify what is not permitted, including terms such as ‘the promotion of 
hatred’. If people think that their messages and content could be removed and, more 
importantly, that their user accounts could be closed by Internet companies, they 
might think twice about sending or uploading certain content. The thought of being 
denied access to Facebook and Twitter, say, may be unconscionable for many people. 
In other words, it is not clear that the relevant free speech objection to the community 
standards or codes of conduct used by Internet companies is of a different order to the 
objection to criminal laws banning hate speech including offline hate speech. Then 
again, perhaps the suggestion is that when national governments introduce laws 
banning incitement to hatred, say, the legislation is subject to scrutiny by democratic 
chambers and civil servants and the result is that the language of the legislation can 
become more precise, to the point that it has less potential to chill speech. However, 
there is nothing to stop Internet companies from going through a similar process of 
perfecting the definitions of hate speech used in their community standards or codes 
of conduct, so as to make them more precise, perhaps in response to feedback from 
users seeking clarification on what is or is not permitted, and in response to 
suggestions from their own in-house moderators as they work with the standards over 
time. Indeed, just as the UK parliament added freedom of expression clauses into the 
new offences of stirring up hatred on grounds of religion and sexual orientation, so 
Internet companies have inserted freedom of expression clauses into their community 
standards and codes of conduct. All of these clauses clarify the limits of the respective 
hate speech regulations in terms of what would, or would not, count as permissible 
speech. 
  Second, government legislation on hate speech is often criticised on the 
grounds that either it is ineffective in reducing the extent of hate speech (Baker, 2009, 
2012; Hare, 2012; Heinze, 2016; Strossen, 1990, 2012) or it is effective and because 
of this it forces hate speakers to become more secretive or to go underground, which 
in turn means that society loses an opportunity to monitor hate speakers (Gellman, 
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1991; Malik, 2005; Smith, 1995; Strossen, 2012) and hate speakers lose an 
opportunity to blow off steam verbally as a sort of pressure valve before they act out 
their beliefs, attitudes and feelings through physical violence (Emerson, 1963; Heins, 
1983; Magruder, 1936). I believe that there are some telling replies that can be made 
to each of the ineffectiveness (Brown, 2015: 239–242; Gelber and McNamara, 2014), 
pushing underground (Delgado and Yun, 1994a: 1816–1818; Parekh, 2005/2006: 
221), and pressure valve (Delgado and Yun, 1994b) objections. Notwithstanding this, 
the point I wish to make here is that surely the same objections can be levelled against 
the regulation of online hate speech. Take the ineffectiveness objection. It might be 
argued that these regulations will not deter users from engaging in hate speech 
because for every hate message or bit of hate speech content that is removed another, 
similar hate message or bit of hate speech content will pops up elsewhere on the same 
Internet messaging service or website or on other parts of the Internet which are 
controlled by Internet companies who decide not to regulate hate speech. Or take the 
pushing underground objection. It might be argued that if Internet companies come 
together and all decide to adopt the same or very similar community standards on 
cyberhate—perhaps as a result of the work of an international association of Internet 
companies or an intergovernmental organisation—this might have the effect of 
forcing hate speakers onto parts of the Internet (including the dark web) which are 
much less easily regulated by Internet companies because of the use of encryption 
software. Once again, it might be possible to reply to these objections to online hate 
speech regulations, but the key point is that these objections are not different in kind 
as between online and offline hate speech regulations. 
 Third, it has been argued that the codes of practice operated by traditional 
media companies which include restrictions on hate speech are less democratic and 
legitimate than the hate speech laws which are enacted by governments and reviewed 
by higher courts of law. Consider once again the Code of Conduct On Countering 
Illegal Hate Speech Online. Here we have an intergovernmental organisation coming 
together with transnational Internet companies to agree upon a set of codes on 
cyberhate that restrict the free speech of ordinary people at the national level without 
each and every national government giving its consent to the agreement. Because the 
Code is not a piece of European Union law but is instead effectively a form of 
voluntary self-regulation adopted by Internet companies in consultation with the 
European Commission, it is not scrutinised nor subject to final approval by the 
European Parliament and its directly elected Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs). This is contrasted with a new piece of hate speech legislation introduced by a 
national government which would undergo scrutiny and final approval by directly 
elected representatives. In the words of European Digital Rights (EDRi), an 
association of civil and human rights organisations from across Europe that lobbies 
for online rights:  
 
the ‘code of conduct’ downgrades the law to a second-class status, behind the 
‘leading role’ of private companies that are being asked to arbitrarily implement 
their terms of service. This process, established outside an accountable 
democratic framework, exploits unclear liability rules for companies. It also 
creates serious risks for freedom of expression as legal but controversial content 




In addition to this, the Code does not have to clear the sorts of constitutional barriers 
which national governments must clear when introducing legislation that limits free 
speech. There is no supreme court or human rights court to which individuals can 
appeal on grounds of a violation of their right to freedom of expression by Internet 
companies. What is more, the day-to-day implementation of the Code including 
adjudication decisions taken about hate speech content are not subject to any review 
by higher courts. So users are vulnerable to bad adjudications which they cannot 
appeal. Allied to this is the fact that, unlike in the case of hate speech laws at the 
national level which are applied by courts in a public way, the inner workings of 
Internet moderation operated by companies under the Code remains for all intents and 
purposes concealed insofar as companies do not make public their adjudications. At 
least when hate speech laws are passed by democratically elected legislatures, the 
laws are scrutinised, debated and challenged often over a lengthy period of time (e.g. 
Bleich, 2011; Brown, 2015: ch. 7, forthcoming c; cf. Heinze, 2016), and, of course, in 
constitutional democracies whatever legislation is finally settled upon must also 
demonstrate itself to be compatible with relevant constitutional guarantees of freedom 
of expression as determined by judges in higher courts of law (domestic), and in some 
cases by judges in international human rights courts. However, it is hard to see why 
these sorts of objections relating to democracy and legitimacy are different or special. 
Arguably the same objections can be put at the door of codes of practice and editorial 
guidelines employed by traditional media companies in relation to television and 
radio broadcasts as well as printed newspaper and magazine articles. The codes of 
practice and editorial guidelines operated by such companies may also cater to a 
perceived social abhorrence of hate speech but in ways that society is not fully aware 
of. Traditional media companies may publish their codes of practice but they do not 
as a matter of course reveal how exactly their editors and content controllers apply or 
adjudicate these codes of practice in particular cases. Companies do not release this 
information because they are not required to do so. They can simply say, ‘This 
content was removed for reasons to do with relevant community standards.’ And, if 
push comes to shove, they can stand behind the excuse that their inner operations are 
commercially sensitive. According to Arthur Jacobson and Bernhard Schlink, this 
means that ordinary people are denied the opportunity to know, reflect on and take 
responsibility for their own abhorrence of hate speech. As such ‘[w]e lose the power 
of progressive moral beings’ (Jacobson and Schlink, 2012: 231).  
 Of course, Internet companies can be subject to forms of political online 
consumerism—meaning, for example, that users can drop Facebook in favour of 
alternative social networking sites if they do not like the fact that Facebook has 
adopted a particular community standard relating to hate speech. But without good 
knowledge of how the community standard is being implemented, users may have 
insufficient reasons to switch to a different social networking site especially given the 
opportunity cost of giving up Facebook. Indeed, even the option of switching to a 
different company disappears as the number of Internet companies adopting similar 
community standards on cyberhate increases. So political consumerism may have 
insufficient power to hold Internet companies to account for adopting the community 
standards that they do. But once again it is hard to see why these concerns about the 
accountability of the regulation of online hate speech by Internet companies is any 
different than concerns about the accountability of the regulation of offline content by 
traditional media companies including broadcasters and newspapers. 
 At this stage some people might try to argue that there is something different 
about the motives of traditional media companies. In the case of traditional media 
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companies (so the thought goes) restrictions on hate speech are primarily driven by 
commercial considerations—keeping as many audience members and potential 
audience members as happy as possible. By contrast, the creators of the large Internet 
companies are, at heart, technologists, cosmopolitans, and progressives, whose main 
aim is to connect the world through ever-greater access to forms of online society and 
to use this online society for good including fighting discrimination and intolerance. 
However, I think it would be difficult to generalise about differences in the 
fundamental values of the creators of traditional media companies and Internet media 
companies. Moreover, it seems naive to ignore the fact that the creators of Internet 
companies are also entrepreneurs who want to grow small businesses into much large 
businesses. One also cannot ignore the fact that, once the creators of Internet 
companies have created large businesses, they often sell them to even larger 
businesses or float them on stock markets so that they become part-owned by lots of 
large corporate shareholders. And these large businesses and corporate shareholders 
may not share the vision of the original creators when it comes to the bottom line. Of 
course, the relevant community standards and codes of conduct of the Internet 
companies almost invariably include declarations and clauses that extol the 
importance of freedom of expression and the need to balance rights. But it is probably 
the case that these declarations and clauses are also put there for pragmatic purposes: 
to give the impression (or maintain the conceit?) that these are the sorts of companies 
that value free speech. Creating this impression might seem especially important for 
Internet companies given facts about the demographics and personal values of people 
who spend a lot of time using the Internet for social interaction—the target market of 
most Internet companies. 
 Notwithstanding all this, I believe that there is one relevant difference between 
the content regulation imposed by Internet companies in respect of their community 
standards and codes of conduct and the self-regulation operated by traditional media 
companies in respect of their codes of practice or editorial guidelines. As mentioned 
earlier, traditional media companies are able to censor content before the content is 
broadcast or published. In that sense codes of practice and editorial guidelines are 
operated as prior self-restraint, meaning that customers end up never seeing or reading 
what it is they are assumed to abhor. This is not so with those Internet companies who 
moderate their users’ messages and content ex post (Cohen-Almagor, 2011, 2015). It 
could be argued that this form of moderation is less objectionable on free speech 
grounds than the prior self-restraint operated by traditional media companies. At least 
users of Facebook, Twitter and YouTube have a brief window of time in which to see 
content that is ultimately taken down. This brief window of time enables users to 
think about and discuss the content and thereafter to reflect on why it was taken down 
or access removed and whether the decision was the right one. Users who did not get 
a chance to see the content or did not notice its being removed can be informed of 
what happened by those who did. Perhaps because of this the argument that, through 
prior self-restraint, traditional media companies deny their audiences the power of 
progressive moral beings does not apply with quite the same force to Internet 
companies who operate ex post Internet moderation. In other words, if prior self-
restraint is the most severe and problematic threat to free speech, and, if it is not 
something standardly operated by social networking websites, Internet messaging 
services and video-sharing websites, for example, then this is one relevant difference 
between free speech objections to the regulation of online as compared to offline hate 
speech. Of course, the same might not be true of Internet Services Providers (ISPs) 
and web hosting services if they block access to websites that contain hate speech or 
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Internet browsers and Web search engines if they insert default settings for Internet-
security controls which block websites based on hate speech content or email 
packages that insert default settings which place filters on emails containing hate 
speech in the subject line such as by sending them directly to spam folders. 
 Of course, arguments against prior self-restraint are not the end of the matter. 
After all, it might be argued that traditional media companies and Internet companies 
serve different functions or purposes and that these differences might justify 
variations in the forms of restraint they each employ. For example, arguably one of 
the distinctive purposes of newspapers, radio stations and TV channels is to provide 
editorialised content reflecting particular values and worldviews, and so they will 
need to censor speech ex ante in accordance with their editorial policy. By contrast, 
Internet companies often maintain that their distinctive purpose is to provide easily 
accessible platforms for the exchange of content between users and catering to users 
who adhere to a plurality of values and worldviews. Of course, in reality many 
Internet companies do engage in user-focused editorialising—consider, for example, 
the way Facebook employs computer algorithms to control the content that makes it 
on to users’ Newsfeeds based on their previous Facebook habits. But setting aside 
user-focused editorialising, the aforementioned difference in distinct function or 
purpose might explain (and to some extent justify) the tighter, stronger form of self-
restraint that traditional media companies normally employ. Thus, arguments against 
prior self-restraint must be viewed in the light of other considerations that might serve 
to justify it. 
 In this section I have looked at objections to online hate speech regulations 
and found many of these objections to be generic, except in respect of objections 
against prior self-restraint which, at first glance, seem to be more applicable to 
traditional media companies than to Internet companies. Perhaps there are other free 
speech objections to online hate speech regulations that I have not considered and that 
are sui generis. I do not discount that possibility. But I do not know what they are at 
this point. Nevertheless, I believe that, in the final analysis, whether the regulation of 
online hate speech (by governments or by Internet companies) can be justified all 
things considered will depend on finding a principled compromise between principles 
that support free speech on the Internet but also principles that support the regulation 




The main aims of this article have been to try to explain why one might reasonably 
think that online (as compared to offline) hate speech has a distinctive quality; why 
the regulation of online (as compared to offline) hate speech has a distinctive quality; 
and why free speech objections to online (as compared to offline) hate speech have a 
distinctive quality. In the first respect I argued that the supposed anonymity of the 
Internet may not be as distinctive as is first assumed but that the instantaneous nature 
of some parts of the Internet and the spontaneous hate speech that it encourages might 
be a better, and often overlooked, reason to mark it out as different. The instantaneous 
nature of the Internet also partly explains why Internet companies are thought to have 
a special role in regulating online hate speech. But, by the same token, people who 
object to the regulation of hate speech can point to equally important deficits in 
democracy, legitimacy and accountability when Internet companies regulate hate 
speech as opposed to when government organisations and agencies suppress hate 
speech. However, despite these differences I also observed that the regulation of 
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online hate speech and free speech objections to the regulation of online hate speech 
by Internet companies are not sui generis if one compares it with the regulation of 
offline hate speech and free speech objections to the regulation of offline hate speech 
by traditional media companies—but with one notable exception, the use of prior self-
restraint by traditional media companies and objections to that form of restraint. 
 A more general implication of the observations I have made so far is that if 
parts of the Internet encourage spontaneous hate speech, and if online hate speech 
already outstrips offline hate speech measured as a proportion of total hate speech and 
will continue to increase in the future, then we might expect to see more not less 
spontaneous hate speech in the future. This conditional implication is closely allied, of 
course, to the ease of use and relatively low cost of being online. And the fact that 
people are already likely to be connected to the Internet in the course of their 
professional, private and civic lives—to work, to consume, to maintain friendships, to 
find romantic partners, to learn, to play, and to participate in the formation of 
democratic public opinion—means that they do not have to go out of their way to 
become spontaneous online hate speakers. Of course, this also means that people are 
not safe from spontaneous hate speech even in their own homes. What is more, 
because the regulation of hate speech is especially challenging it may be that Internet 
companies should play a bigger part in tackling this problem, day-to-day, as compared 
to government organisations and agencies, irrespective of, and over and above, any 
commercial reasons that Internet companies might have for doing so.  
 All of this may also serve to support the idea that, not just intergovernmental 
organisations, but also all national governments should be working as closely as 
possible with Internet companies to help find ways of combating online hate speech, 
with national governments in a sense contracting out the regulation of the Internet to 
these companies, at least when it comes to day-to-day adjudications on content. No 
doubt this form of outsourcing of some of the responsibility for tackling online hate 
speech faces serious free speech objections: one being that decisions about restricting 
the basic human right to freedom of expression are far too important to be contracted 
out to Internet companies who on paper lack the democracy, legitimacy and 
accountability of government organisations and agencies. But I end with one salutary 
point. If social networking websites, Internet messaging services, and video-sharing 
websites, for example, do not, unlike traditional media companies, engage in prior 
self-restraint, then at least the most severe and problematic form of limitation on the 
right to freedom of expression has not been contracted out. Filtering and blocking 
functions performed by ISPs, web hosting services, Internet browsers and Web search 
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1 The term ‘hate speech’ is an opaque idiom with multiple meanings covering a 
heterogeneous collection of expressive phenomena (Brown, forthcoming a, 
forthcoming b). I shall not seek here to outline the full variety of phenomena captured 
by the term ‘hate speech’. However, in what follows, where I do want to refer to a 
particular form of hate speech I shall specify that form. I shall also use the term 
‘cyberhate’ as shorthand for hate speech occurring online as opposed to offline.  
2 Parts 3 and 3A of the Public Order Act 1986 (as amended by the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Act 2006, the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, and the 
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013). 
3 ss 28-33, 50A of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (as amended by the Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001); and ss 145 and 146 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 (as amended by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 
2012). 
4 For a nuanced discussion of anonymity, the Internet and law, see Barendt (2016: ch. 
6). 
5 Bristol Crown Court, 29 July 2011. 
6 For a discussion of the role of the Internet alongside, and in conjunction with, print 
and broadcast media in the communication of hate messages in Ethiopia, for example, 
see Gagliardone et al (2014: 30–35).  
7 Swansea Magistrates Court, 19 March 2012.  
8 See notes 2 and 3 above. 
9 For a classification of different forms of hate speech that are subject to regulations in 
different parts of the world, see Brown (2015: ch. 2). 
10 See note 2 above. 
11 https://www.youtube.com/yt/policyandsafety/en-GB/communityguidelines.html 
(accessed 8 April 2017). 
12 https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2801939 (accessed 8 April 2017). 
13 www.facebook.com/communitystandards# (accessed 8 April 2017). 
14 https://support.twitter.com/articles/20170425# (accessed 8 April 2017). 
15 https://www.microsoft.com/en-gb/servicesagreement (accessed 8 April 2017). 
16 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-
rights/files/hate_speech_code_of_conduct_en.pdf (accessed 8 April 2017). 
17 The new agreement covers illegal incitement to hatred as defined by the Council of 
the European Union Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia by 
Means of Criminal Law 2008/913/JHA, of 28 November 2008—that is, ‘publicly 
inciting to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of such 
a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic 
origin’. 
18 Compare the willingness of the big players in the Internet sector to work with the 
European Commission on formulating and adopting codes of conduct covering online 
hate speech with the ambivalent response by nearly half of the member states of the 
Council of Europe to Treaty 189, the Additional Protocol to the Convention on 
Cybercrime, Concerning the Criminalization of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic 
Nature Committed Through Computer Systems, Strasbourg, 28 January 2003, CETS 
No. 189. Available at: 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?doc
umentId=090000168008160f (accessed 8 April 2017). To date it has only been 
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ratified by 24 of 47 member states. http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/189/signatures?p_auth=BTkvMdrh (accessed 8 April 2017). 
19 See note 2 above. 
20 See note 3 above. 
21 s 127 of Communications Act 2003. 
22 http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/communications_sent_via_social_media/#a09 
(accessed 8 April 2017). 
23 http://www.bbc.co.uk/editorialguidelines/guidelines/harm-and-offence/portrayal 
(accessed 8 April 2017). 
24 The BBC publishes details of upheld complaints on its website, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/complaints/reports (accessed 8 April 2017). The BBC Trust 
publishes details of appeals on its website, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/our_work/complaints_and_appeals/esc.html (accessed 
8 April 2017). 
25 https://www.ipso.co.uk/editors-code-of-practice (accessed 8 April 2017). 
26 https://edri.org/edri-access-now-withdraw-eu-commission-forum-discussions 
(accessed 8 April 2017). 
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